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ESSAY

YATES V. UNITED STATES: A CASE STUDY
IN OVERCRIMINALIZATION

STEPHEN F. SMITH†
INTRODUCTION
In Yates v. United States,1 the Supreme Court will decide whether tossing
undersized fish overboard can be prosecuted under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
of 2002,2 a law aimed at preventing massive frauds of the sort that led to the
collapse of Enron and sent shock waves throughout the economy.3 Although
the legal issue is narrow, the case has far-reaching significance. The Yates
prosecution is a case study in the dangers posed by “overcriminalization”:
the existence of multitudinous, often overlapping criminal laws that are so
poorly defined that they sweep within their ambit conduct far afield from
their intended target.
The Supreme Court should set an example in Yates of how courts should
counteract overcriminalization through nuanced statutory construction. In
particular, courts should resist the allure of specious “plain meaning”
arguments and, in the many cases of textual ambiguity, exercise informed
judicial discretion in light of the myriad potential dangers of expansive
interpretations of criminal statutes. Unless the Court leads by example,

† Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) (granting certiorari to review

United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059 (11th
Cir. 2013)).
2 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.).
3 See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE:
WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX I T 7-22 (2006) (discussing Sarbanes–Oxley as a product
of the post-Enron “regulatory panic”).

(147)
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prosecutors will continue to exploit poorly defined federal crimes to produce
miscarriages of justice such as those that occurred in Yates.
I. YATES AS A TEXTBOOK EXAMPLE OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION
Yates has attracted attention because it involves an obvious misuse of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act to make a serious crime out of a minor regulatory
infraction.4 The defendant, John Yates, was not a high-ranking corporate
officer, nor was he an accountant or other professional charged with aiding
corporations with meeting financial reporting requirements.5 He did not
defraud anyone or assist in the commission of a fraud.6 To the contrary,
until his conviction rendered him unemployable, Yates hired himself out as the
captain of a commercial fishing boat operating in the Gulf of Mexico, and was
sufficiently impecunious to qualify for representation by the federal public
defender and to proceed in forma pauperis in the Supreme Court.7 Nonetheless,
he was convicted under Sarbanes–Oxley—and thus faced a maximum
punishment of twenty years in prison—for throwing back into the ocean some
fish that were allegedly too small to be caught under federal regulations.8
One of the new offenses created by Sarbanes–Oxley—the one that resulted
in Yates’s conviction—authorizes up to twenty years in prison for anyone
who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or
makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with intent
to obstruct a federal investigation.9 For federal prosecutors, the undersized
fish Yates netted were “tangible objects,” and tossing them overboard
“destroyed” or “concealed” them.10 Incredibly, the Eleventh Circuit not

4 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices to Weigh Finance Law as It Was Applied to Little Fish, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/us/politics/justices-to-weigh-fishermansconviction-under-federal-finance-law.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/CTV2-RAYG.
5 See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451 (U.S. June 30, 2014) (explaining
how Yates was employed as a commercial fisherman and captain of a fishing vessel).
6 See Yates, 733 F.3d at 1061-62 (recounting how Yates’s conviction arose solely because Yates
allegedly instructed his crew to throw undersized fish overboard).
7 See Yates v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) (granting Yates’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis).
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (imposing a twenty-year maximum prison sentence for
“[d]estruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations”); see also Yates, 733
F.3d at 1062-63 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1519 as the basis for Yates’s conviction).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
10 See generally Brief for the United States at 14, Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451 (U.S.
Aug. 19, 2014) (“The text, structure, purpose, and history of [18 U.S.C. § 1519] all confirm that
Section 1519 prohibits the destruction of any kind of physical evidence—including fish—so long as
the destruction occurs with the requisite obstructive intent.”).
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only sustained that curious interpretation, but viewed it as compelled by the
plain language of the statute.11
For all the effort prosecutors expended to convict him in a four-day jury
trial, however, Yates received a jail sentence more typical of those imposed
in state traffic and misdemeanor courts. He was sentenced to a mere thirty
days of incarceration, plus three years of supervised release.12 Such a light
sentence could have been imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a),13 a statute
that, as compared to Sarbanes–Oxley, more readily applied to Yates’s
conduct. Nonetheless, prosecutors insisted on a conviction under section
1519 as well.
The Eleventh Circuit could have rejected the Justice Department’s
overreach. Unfortunately, however, it endorsed the curious use of
Sarbanes–Oxley to regulate the catch-and-release of undersized fish. The
court’s analysis of the statute, to put it charitably, was unbelabored,
amounting to one short paragraph concluding that “‘tangible object,’ as § 1519
uses that term, unambiguously applies to fish.”14 This issue, which the panel
found capable of such cursory treatment, attracted the Supreme Court’s
attention, suggesting that the lower court missed something major—as
indeed it did.
It is a gross oversimplification to view the interpretive question in Yates
as whether a fish is a “tangible object.” It is a commonplace of statutory
construction that words draw their meaning from context.15 The Eleventh
Circuit never asked if treating a fish as a “tangible object” for purposes of
section 1519 makes sense.
Putting the phrase “tangible object” back into its statutory context yields
a result diametrically opposed to the Eleventh Circuit’s. In keeping with the
obvious legislative purpose of cracking down on accounting firms and other
outside professionals who aid and abet fraudulent financial reporting by
corporations,16 the law applies to “record[s], document[s], or tangible
object[s]” in which it is possible to “make[] a false entry.”17 Because “mak[ing] a
11 See Yates, 733 F.3d at 1064 (concluding that “tangible object” “unambiguously” applies to fish).
12 Id. at 1063.
13 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012) (criminalizing the destruction of property “before, during, or

after any search for or seizure of property” for the purpose of preventing the government from
taking possession of that property).
14 Yates, 733 F.3d at 1064.
15 See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (explaining that “[t]he construction
of statutory language often turns on context”).
16 See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (emphasis added). Section 1519 provides, in full:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or
makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to
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false entry” applies to “records, documents, or tangible objects,” each of the
object terms is properly read to apply only to items in which making a “false
entry” is possible.
There are “tangible objects” in which, like “records” and “documents,” it
is possible to make a “false entry.” Computer hard drives and compact discs,
for example, come readily to mind. Fish, however, are most certainly not
among them.
By ignoring the context in which “tangible object” appears, the Eleventh
Circuit disregarded settled principles of statutory construction. As the
Supreme Court has admonished, “a word is known by the company it keeps
(the doctrine of noscitur a sociis).”18 Strict adherence to this rule is necessary
“to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent
with its accompanying words, thus giving ‘unintended breadth to the Acts
of Congress.’”19
Noscitur a sociis called for a narrow interpretation of the statute in Yates.
Reading “tangible objects” as limited to objects, similar to records and
documents, in which data are stored reunifies “tangible objects” with
“records” and “documents.” It similarly restores the proper use of section
1519 for preventing the fraudulent accounting practices with which
Sarbanes–Oxley was so obviously concerned.20 It is little wonder, then, that
the appeals court gave the statutory context the back of the judicial hand.
The context in which “tangible object” appears is relevant in another
respect as well. “Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term
follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any
case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Id.
18 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995).
19 Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
20 According to the Senate Report to the bill which became section 1519,

“[t]he intent of the
provision is simple; people should not be destroying, altering, or falsifying documents to obstruct
any government function.” S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 15 (2002). Thus, section 1519 sought to
guarantee that “greed does not succeed” by “ensur[ing] that evidence—both physical and
testimonial—is preserved and available in fraud cases,” allowing the courts to hold those
responsible for corporate frauds civilly and criminally liable. Id. at 2. The use of legislative history
is controversial in some quarters, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the use of
legislative aids to statutory interpretation, especially where, as here, it confirms the meaning of the
text. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48:1 (7th ed. 2014) (explaining that the Supreme Court has endorsed
legislative history as an extrinsic aid to statutory interpretation).
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to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.”21 This principle fully
applies to section 1519.
“Tangible object” does not appear in a vacuum but is a catch-all phrase
included within an enumeration that includes “documents” and “records.”22
“Documents” and “records” have one common feature: they can contain or
be used to store financial data. That is why Congress, concerned with
preserving the evidence necessary to hold accountable perpetrators of
corporate or financial frauds, made it a crime to destroy or conceal documents
and records. Under ejusdem generis, “tangible object” should be limited to
objects like documents and records (but unlike fish), which can be used to
store financial data.
The Eleventh Circuit also violated the “‘cardinal principle of statutory
construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant.’”23 In its view, the phrase “tangible object” includes
anything “‘having or possessing physical form.’”24 This broad interpretation
renders “records” and “documents” in section 1519 entirely redundant.
After all, any “record” or “document” would be a “tangible object,” as
the Eleventh Circuit interprets the latter phrase. In that event, “tangible
object” leaves no work for “records” and “documents” to do. Only one
interpretation of “tangible object” leaves room for “records” and “documents”
to have independent meaning: “tangible object” must encompass only
objects, other than records or documents, in which financial data are stored.
Unsurprisingly, this interpretation of “tangible object” does not include
within its ambit fish (of any size) or any other objects not used to store data.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit overlooked yet another indication that
Congress intended a far narrower scope for “tangible object” in section 1519:
the provision’s title. The title, which is properly consulted to shed light on
statutory meaning,25 leaves no doubt that section 1519 was intended to
prevent accounting firms and other entities involved in corporate financial
reporting from aiding corporations in perpetrating or concealing frauds on
the public.
21 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991).
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
23 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533

U.S. 167,
174 (2001)).
24 United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1592 (9th ed. 2009)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014).
25 See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (holding
that “statutory titles and section headings are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the
meaning of a statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Section 1519 is titled “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records
in Federal investigations and bankruptcy.”26 This title makes it clear that
section 1519 was aimed to penalize the falsification and destruction of
records like those in “the cover up” of Enron’s duplicity, as the Senate
Report described it.27 To say the least, the Eleventh Circuit’s expansive
interpretation of “tangible objects” to allow enforcement of federal fishing
regulations does not sit comfortably with the more limited purposes indicated
by the title and language of section 1519.
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretive problems do not end with “tangible
objects.” The conduct for which Yates was convicted—namely, casting
previously caught undersized fish overboard—does not equate with
“destroying” the fish. The fish are “destroyed” when they are killed, not
when they are thrown back into the sea (which, after all, is their natural
habitat). Without proof that Yates actually killed the fish—and did so after
having been warned that they would be seized by federal authorities in
port—Yates could not properly be convicted for “destroying” the released fish.
Also, on the particular facts of Yates, throwing the undersized grouper
overboard after being ordered to retain them for seizure may not constitute
“concealing” the fish from federal investigators. After all, the federal field
officer who had boarded Yates’s ship at sea already had measured the fish
and, rightly or wrongly, determined they were undersized.28 The evidence
of undersized fish was obtained out at sea, before the ship returned to port,
and the later disposal of the fish did not “conceal” anything from the
government, which already had the evidence necessary to charge Yates with
a violation of federal fishing regulations.

26
27

18 U.S.C. § 1519.
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4, 8, 11 (2002). The Senate Judiciary Committee found that additional legislation was necessary because, “[i]nstead of preserving records relevant and material to
the later investigation of Enron or any private action against Enron,” Enron’s accountant, Arthur
Anderson LLP, engaged in “a wholesale destruction of documents,” efforts which “extended
beyond paper records and included efforts to purge the computer hard drives and E-mail system
of Enron related files.” Id. at 2-4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 See Yates, 733 F.3d at 1061 (recounting how Officer Jones measured the fish before instructing
Yates to retain them for seizure in port).
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II. THE EFFECTS OF CARELESS INTERPRETATION IN AN
ERA OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION
It would appear that the Eleventh Circuit fell prey—as federal courts
often do29—to the view that they should expand criminal statutes whenever
necessary to convict blameworthy offenders. This, however, is not the
proper role of federal courts in criminal cases. Their role is to ensure that
offenders are not convicted in federal court unless their conduct falls
squarely within the scope of a criminal law duly passed by Congress, and to
resolve any doubts about the meaning or applicability of a criminal statute
in favor of individual liberty, as the venerable rule of lenity demands.30
By departing from their proper role, as the Eleventh Circuit did in
Yates, and by overlooking the virtues of interpreting criminal statutes
narrowly, the federal courts have exacerbated the problems associated with
overcriminalization. They have done so by “consistently ma[king] federal
criminal law broader and more severe . . . than even Congress may have
intended.”31 The Eleventh Circuit’s approach is no aberration, but rather
reflects how federal judges all too often perform their interpretive tasks in
criminal cases.32
Because of the Eleventh Circuit’s misinterpretation of section 1519, the
statute now reaches morally blameless conduct. Even though, as the court of
appeals no doubt understood, it is blameworthy to discard fish when
properly instructed by a federal officer to retain them for seizure, the crime
of “destroying” or “concealing” fish as “tangible objects” is no longer limited
to blameworthy conduct. Rather, discarding undersized fish is now exposed
to prosecution and conviction under section 1519 even when done innocuously.
To see why, it is important to understand that Yates’s actions were
blameworthy only because he had been instructed to retain the fish for
29 See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 893-96 (2005)
(discussing “the puzzling practice of courts taking ambiguous criminal statutes and interpreting
them expansively”).
30 See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“In the
interpretation of a criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity, where there is room for debate,
one should not choose the construction that disfavors the defendant.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
31 Smith, supra note 29, at 884. Congressman Michael Oxley, co-sponsor of the law at issue in
Yates, argued in an amicus brief that this phenomenon is precisely what happened in the Yates
prosecution. See Brief for the Honorable Michael Oxley as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 1-2, Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451 (U.S. July 7, 2014) (opposing “the Government’s
attempt to expand [Sarbanes–Oxley’s anti-shredding provision] to reach conduct far beyond
anything that Congress ever anticipated or intended”).
32 See generally Smith, supra note 29, at 897-925 (citing examples of how courts routinely expand
criminal laws, in derogation of the rule of lenity, when blameworthy conduct is involved).
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seizure when he arrived back at port. Imagine, however, a more routine
catch-and-release operation. Presumably a fisherman would not know that
he has caught undersized fish until after he has reeled them into his boat. A
law-abiding person would then naturally seek to ensure that all his fish were
of proper size and otherwise in compliance with applicable legal requirements.
If a hapless fisherman discovers on his own (and not during the type of
search by a federal officer that occurred in Yates) that he has caught undersized
fish, he would quite properly cast the undersized fish back overboard. That
innocent act of trying to comply with the law, however, would constitute
“destroying” or “concealing” a “tangible object” under the Eleventh Circuit’s
interpretation. The federal government would thus be able to charge and
convict the law-abiding fisherman for the morally blameless act of releasing
undersized fish on his own initiative. This result is one the Supreme Court
has wisely strived to avoid in construing criminal statutes.33 To prevent the
blameworthy Yates from slipping through the cracks, the government, with
the blessing of the court of appeals, turned section 1519 into a trap for the
unwary fisherman who returns undersized fish to the sea in a commendable
(but now criminal) effort to comply with federal regulations.
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s broad reading of section 1519 dramatically ratchets up the potential punishment for Yates’s conduct, in violation
of the principle that the punishment should “fit” the offender’s crime.
Possession of undersized fish is not itself a crime; it is only a civil violation
punishable by a small fine or a brief suspension of the culprit’s fishing
license.34 Thanks to the Justice Department’s misuse of section 1519, this
regulatory infraction is now a serious felony, on the order of the widespread
financial frauds which motivated passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. A
wave of the judicial wand has thus transformed a minor regulatory offense
into a major felony.
As if that were not bad enough, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation
overrode Congress’s own grading of an offense which, unlike section 1519,
could plausibly apply to Yates’s conduct. As federal prosecutors knew
(because they charged him under it, in addition to section 1519), there was a
33 See generally id. at 889-90 (noting how the Supreme Court “take[s] moral innocence into
account in construing the actus reus of federal crimes”).
34 See Southeast Region Magnuson-Stevens Act Penalty Schedule, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gces/2-USFisheries/SE_msa_comm_rec_6-03.pdf (last
updated June 13, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/T73E-7ATC (recommending fines of $500–$50,000
and a maximum forty-five day fishing license suspension for first-time violations regarding the
size, condition, or quantity of fish); see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1857(1)(A), (G), 1858(a), (g) (2012)
(punishing violations of fishing laws with civil penalties and permit sanctions).
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federal criminal law specifically applicable to Yates’s conduct. That law is
18 U.S.C. § 2232(a), which makes it a crime “before, during, or after any
[authorized] search for or seizure of property” to “destroy[]” or “dispose[]
of ” property “for the purpose of preventing or impairing the Government’s
lawful authority to take such property into its custody.”35
Had the Eleventh Circuit required the government to proceed, in cases
such as Yates’s, under section 2232(a), a far lower maximum punishment
would have applied. The maximum sentence under section 2232(a) is a mere
five years,36 one-quarter of the twenty-year maximum that section 1519
allows.37 Expanding the scope of section 1519 serves merely to ratchet up the
maximum punishment Congress prescribed for Yates’s specific conduct—
disposing of property to prevent its seizure by federal enforcement
authorities—in favor of a much-higher maximum that Congress enacted to
punish frauds on financial markets. With such a powerful club added to its
already formidable arsenal—not by Congress, mind you, but rather by the
Eleventh Circuit—the Justice Department will have yet another potent
weapon with which to extract guilty pleas from the future Yateses of the world.
This, too, is a common, albeit regrettable, consequence of the federal
courts’ reluctance to interpret criminal statutes narrowly. In a regime of
overcriminalization, considerable redundancies exist throughout the criminal
code.38 Not surprisingly, expansive interpretations of fraud and other
generic statutes often swallow up criminal conduct for which Congress
elsewhere provided lesser penalties in more specific statutes or trigger
otherwise inapplicable statutory mandatory minimums.39 This serial
overriding of legislative grading of offenses translates directly into more
prosecutorial power to extract guilty pleas—and into more sentencing
power for prosecutors to use to drive up the punishment Congress prescribed
for particular offenses. In a regime where more than ninety-five percent of
federal defendants plead guilty,40 the last thing we need is even more
prosecutorial power.
35 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012).
36 Id.
37 Id. § 1519.
38 See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102

J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
537, 565 (2012) (describing the “enormous overlap across federal criminal statutes” as one of the
“main problem[s] with overcriminalization”).
39 See generally Smith, supra note 29, at 908-25 (examining prosecutions under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Hobbs Act, and mail and wire fraud statutes as
examples of prosecutors exploiting statutory redundancies to drive up penalties).
40 LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH
SUMMARY 1 (2011), available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/7J5E-6GX4.
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CONCLUSION
Yates gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to make clear that courts
should take seriously the principle that federal criminal statutes should be
construed narrowly, even if the particular offenders before the court are, to
some degree, blameworthy. Otherwise, the sky is the limit once prosecutors
deem a defendant a bad actor, a regime that results in a presumption that
criminal statutes will be broadly construed, in violation of society’s “instinctive
distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly
said they should.”41
Nevertheless, courts need not fully embrace the rule of lenity to start
making serious inroads on overcriminalization. Courts may retain the
flexibility to expand ambiguous criminal statutes if they carefully consider
the consequences of expansive interpretations in particular contexts. If, as in
Yates, a broad reading would expose morally blameless conduct to punishment,
a narrow interpretation is appropriate.
Moreover, a narrow interpretation may be warranted even if a criminal
statute, as broadly construed, would not reach any morally blameless
conduct. Yates gives us a stark example: allowing prosecutors to prosecute
under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for casting overboard undersized fish serves no
purpose, except to increase the penalty for possession of undersized fish
from administrative sanctions to felonies, and to ratchet up the punishment
authorized by Congress for disposing of property targeted for government
seizure from five years under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) to twenty years under 18
U.S.C. § 1519. If legislative supremacy in criminal law is to mean anything,
prosecutors cannot be permitted an end-run around legislative grading
decisions, one of the most basic policy determinations a legislature makes in
creating crimes.42
If courts pursue the interpretive strategies outlined here, they will at last
be part of the solution to the problem of overcriminalization. As things now
stand, however, courts are part of the problem, and a major one at that.
This has to change. Yates provides a golden opportunity for the Supreme

41 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 209 (1967)); see also Smith,
supra note 29, at 925-30 (explaining that the default rule in federal criminal cases is now closer to a
“rule of severity” than a rule of lenity).
42 For an extensive argument about how and why to restore proportionality to federal criminal
law, see generally Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 141-55
(2009), and Smith, supra note 29, at 930-49.
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Court to chart a path toward overcriminalization reform through more
sensible approaches to the interpretation of federal criminal laws.

Preferred Citation: Stephen F. Smith, Yates v. United States: A Case
Study in Overcriminalization, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 147 (2014), http://
www.pennlawreview.com/online/163-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-123.pdf.

